Theory and History Behind Business Cycles: Are the 1990s the Onset of a Golden Age? by Victor Zarnowitz
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THEORY AND HISTORY BEHIND
BUSINESS CYCLES: ARE THE 1990S








The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
©1999by Victor Zarnowitz. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including ©notice,is given to the source.Theory and History Behind Business Cycles:
Are the 1990s the Onset of a Golden Age?
Victor Zarnowitz
NBER Working Paper No. 7010
March 1999
JEL No. E3, E30, E31, E32
ABSTRACT
The disputes over the prospects for the current U.S. expansion reopen the issue of the causes
of business cycles. A recurrent concern about the present is that expectations of business profits and
market returns may be outrunning the economy's potential to deliver.
The theory presented in this paper ties together profits, investment, credit, stock prices,
inflation and interest rates. I discuss new estimates of profit and investment functions with important
roles for growth of demand and productivity, price and cost levels, risk perception, credit volume
and credit difficulties. The relationships among these endogenous variables are viewed as
constituting an enduring core of business cycles, the exogenous shocks and policy effects as more
transitory and peripheral.
The U.S. upswing of the past three years provides a vivid example of how profits,
investment, and an exuberant stock market can reinforce each other. Long business expansions
benefit society in several ways but they generate imbalances and are difficult to sustain. Recent
events in Asia demonstrate how investment-driven booms can give way to a protracted stagnation
with tendencies toward deflation and underconsumption or to severe depressions.
After a deterioration in the 1 970s and early I 980s, U.S. business cycles moderated again, as
in the first two post-W WIT decades. But globally recessions became more frequent and more severe
in the second half of the postwar era. The arguments in favor a new Golden Age are generally not
persuasive.
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Some have viewed the current business expansion in the United
States as the onset of a Golden Age in which the long-time evils of
inflationary booms followed by recessions with high unemployment
will never return.  It is not surprising that the excellent
economic conditions in the mid- and late 1990s -- substantial real
economic growth, falling unemployment rate, low inflation, and a
persistent bull market in stocks -- have led to a widespread
euphoria.  During such earlier notable economic expansions as the
1920s and the 1960s, consumer and investor confidence rose to high
levels, as growing numbers of people came to believe that a seismic
shift has taken place and great new opportunities were opening up
at remarkably low costs and risks.  The vision of endless and
uninterrupted expansion of total employment, output, real income
and wealth is, of course, immensely attractive not only to
economists, but to all people of good will. 
The happy prophecy of a growing recession-free economy has
been ascribed to a number of different changes in the economy, but
none of these suggested reasons is fully persuasive.
1  Some of the
arguments seem to make the dubious assumption that factors which
raise productivity growth must also lead to greater economic
stability.  Others exaggerate the reasons why the economy may be
more stable now than in the past into a claim that economic
instability is now obsolete. All leave ample room for3
counterarguments.
First, the U.S. economy is allegedly much more stable because
of the successes of the recent "downsizing" or rationalization
efforts of business management.  However, layoffs, cost-cutting,
corporate reorganizations and factor reallocations have long been
part and parcel of the cyclical growth process; for example, Davis,
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) discuss in rich detail how job
destruction varies greatly over the business cycle, rising strongly
in recessions, while job creation varies much less.  Clearly,
effective labor cost reduction might at first raise unemployment
and the share of profits, but later enhance productivity and
growth.  The same companies that become more efficient through
downsizing will then need or want to grow in the future, and so
will turn to "upsizing," from layoffs to hires, from downward to
upward wage adjustments.  It is not clear why such long-standing
frictions associated with cyclical or irregular supply and demand
shifts should permanently alter the cyclical growth process, or why
any allocative shocks due to changes in business policy should have
more than mixed and temporary effects.
Second, some have claimed that the technological breakthroughs
in computer hardware and software will assure greater economic
stability.  Clearly, technological advances have been indispensable
throughout the modern era in promoting productivity, economic
growth, rising standards of living, and even effective systems of
government.  But the models that rely on generally unidentified4
exogenous productivity shocks as the primary explanation of the
"real" business cycles, are, I believe, generally lacking in
plausibility and evidence (Zarnowitz, 1992, ch. 1 and 2).  After
all, most technical changes are localized and gradual, with long
half-lives in their adoption and diffusion.  In the 1990s, the
notable progress in computer technology has certainly contributed
to the recent sharp rise in business investment and profits.  But a
strong productivity-enhancing effect of computers is yet to be
documented, and it is not at all clear why and how this particular
technological advance should perpetuate the present U.S. business
expansion.
Third, inventory control is said to have improved greatly, in
a way that will make the economy more stable.  This claim has some
truth.  Movements in inventories do tend to propagate economic
fluctuations; for example, an economic slowdown causes a build-up
of inventories which then becomes a secondary cause of business
output weakening further.  The ratio of manufacturing and trade
inventories to sales has followed a gradual downward trend in the
1990s, probably thanks to the widespread adoption of just-in-time
inventory control systems, which tend to reduce the average stocks
of purchased materials and finished products on hand.  Leaner
inventories are likely to have smaller macroeconomic effects. 
However, it is also true that business inventory investment in
constant dollars was about as volatile and as cyclical in the 1990s
as it had been in the past, and volatility in inventories certainly5
remains large enough to play a substantial role in propagating
economic cycles.
A fourth argument is that the share in total U.S. employment
of the relatively volatile goods-producing sectors like
manufacturing and construction has declined in favor of the
presumably more stable services such as trade, finance,
transportation, entertainment, education and government.  This
shift does tend to moderate business cycles, largely by reducing
the weight of cyclically volatile inventory investment.  But many
services appear to be becoming more cyclical, as they confront
growing competition at home and abroad.  For example, business and
consumer services actually declined in the recessions of 1981-82
and 1990-91, while their growth had merely slowed down in earlier
downturns (Fosler and Stiroh, 1998).
Fifth, it is argued that deregulation of financial and other
industries has helped to stabilize the economy. One common example
harks back to the time from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, when
the Regulation Q ceilings on the interest that could be paid on
bank and savings and loan accounts were in place.  During this
time, when short-term interest rates rose above the ceilings, funds
poured from banks and thrifts into direct money-market instruments,
which in turn severely reduced the quantity of available consumer
and mortgage credit.  Clearly, excessive or wrongheaded regulation
can harm efficient resource allocation and aggravate economic
instability.  Also, one can make a strong case that more free6
competition in banking, airlines, trucking, and other industries
has increased productivity growth; and to the extent that relative
price flexibility is enhanced, less instability in quantities may
be expected.  But it seems farfetched to think that more
deregulation will deliver large benefits in stabilizing the United
States economy.
A sixth claim is that we have learned how to use discretionary
government macroeconomic policies in a way that reduces or ends
cyclical instability.  The Federal Reserve has allegedly learned
how to forecast inflation and how to avert it by timely increases
in short-term interest rates.  Fiscal policy is no longer used for
discretionary stabilization purposes for which it is unsuited; in
the past, it was more often than not misapplied or mistimed,
creating at least as much economic instability as it reduced. 
However, there is no clear support in the data for assertions that
government can anticipate business recessions or financial crises,
nor that it can avert such events with preemptive action.  True,
policy-makers can and sometimes do ameliorate recessions, but
wrong, mistimed, or bungled policies can also destabilize the
economy.
Finally, globalization is argued to have reduced cyclical
instability.  Global markets diminish the economy's dependence on
domestic demand by creating new markets abroad for U.S.-produced
goods and services.  They also open up new sources of supply for
raw and intermediate materials, final consumer and producer goods,7
and labor, with the consequence of reducing domestic inflationary
pressures on prices and wages.  Capital markets have become
increasingly global, too, which was supposed to make them broader
and more liquid and to reduce the risk of market bubbles and
crashes.  But while greater openness of economies can surely bring
benefits, it also can bring increased vulnerability.  Since the
economic debacle in East Asia over the last few years, the
attendant risks of financial meltdowns in Russia and Latin America,
and the manner in which these dangers have contributed to
volatility in stock markets everywhere, talk that globalization
will put an end to business cycles has understandably dwindled.
Where and How to Proceed
The disputes over the prospects for the current U.S. expansion
are far from being merely academic:  they reopen the fundamental
yet unresolved issue of the underlying causes of business cycles. 
One widespread and recurrent concern about the present, which has
long roots in the past, is that expectations of business profits
and market returns may be outrunning the economy's potential to
deliver.  Up to a point, high levels of consumer and investor
confidence are self-confirming in their positive consequences. 
However, high confidence can easily shade into overconfidence,
which breeds misdirected or excessive investment.  Eventually, the
balance of expectations shifts, as people realize that the market
fundamentals no longer support the euphoria.  The expansion slows,8
then ends, as spending, employment and output turn down.  All of
this has occurred repeatedly in the past and there is no compelling
reason why it should not happen again.
Believers in the inherent stability of market economies
attribute recessions to policy errors and external disturbances. 
Thus, misguided stimulation by excessively easy credit causes
inflation, the belated curtailment of which causes business
activity to turn down.  Some analysts consider the reactive nature
of government actions and other possible shocks but give no
attention at all to any endogenous theories (for example, Temin,
1998).  On the other hand, those who suspect more systematic
instability doubt that the story of the Fed killing each of the
recent U.S. expansions is the right and full one.  They can point
to many domestic and foreign recessions that originated mainly in
market developments.  Just to take the latest few years,
overconfidence, overborrowing, and overinvestment contributed to
severe business downturns, financial crises, and incipient
deflation overseas, presenting the U.S. economy with new
challenges.
However, it is not with the specific problems and prospects of
the current economic situation that I propose to deal in the body
of this paper. We do not know just when and how the present U.S.
business expansion is going to end: although the business cycle
contains strong self-sustaining elements, it is not predetermined.
Instead, I shall focus on broader theoretical and historical9
perspectives.  The next, central part builds upon selected older
ideas about business cycles, which I believe still have
considerable relevance today when given some new features and
interpretations.  The theory ties together profits, investment,
credit, stock prices, inflation and interest rates, treating their
interactions as central to the process of economic fluctuations and
growth.  It purposely limits itself to essentially endogenous
variables representing private sector activities, leaving
government policies and outside disturbances for subsequent
consideration.  I present and discuss some new estimates of profit
and investment functions with important roles for growth of demand
and productivity, the ratio of price to cost levels, risk
perception, credit volume and credit difficulties. The results of
these regressions are generally consistent with the theoretical
arguments developed in this paper.
The next, much shorter section contends that these endogenous
interactions belong to an enduring core of business cycles.  In
contrast to these central elements of an endogenous explanation of
economic fluctuations, exogenous shocks and policy effects are
typically more transitory and peripheral in nature, and hence
generally less important. I then return briefly to the 1990s to
apply my views on the history and theory of business cycles to this
period.  The final section offers some conclusions.
Profits, Investment, and Credit in Business Cycles10
Business cycles are far from being all alike; their symptoms
and causes differ over time and across economies.  But a powerful
common element runs through the long history of economic
fluctuations around growth trends.  At the center of business
cycles are interacting movements in business profits, investment,
and credit.  Their rises are cumulative and mutually reinforcing,
and so are their declines. Moreover, the three factors play
critical roles in explaining what happens at the downturns and
upturns of total business activity in market economies.
Fluctuations of profits, investment, and credit have been a common
feature of business cycles under very different monetary and
exchange regimes, through inflations and deflations, in the 19th as
well as 20th century, in Europe and Asia as well as in America.
Of the components of aggregate demand, it is the investment
spending by firms and households that is the prime mover in
economic fluctuations, being by far the most cyclical and the most
volatile.  This fact has long been known and recognized.  On the
income side, profits assume the role of the prime mover.  This
insight is less widely accepted, but in good agreement with
economic reasoning and evidence.  Credit from banks and other
private sources provides the finance for the process, whenever the
available reserves permit, under either an external constraint
(such as the gold standard) or domestic constraint of monetary
policy (usually conducted by a central bank).11
The Profit Accelerator
In models of long-term competitive equilibrium, expected
economic profits are driven to zero.  Pure profits are not a
continuous feature of a stationary economy, except where barriers
to market entry or other monopolistic elements persist.  But not
all profits can be explained by deviations from competition or
exploitation of receivers of wages or rent.  In a dynamic economy,
profits serve as the incentive for innovative and entrepreneurial
activity. Several otherwise very different theories agree on this
point and see the source of profits in dynamic phenomena of growth
and possibly disequilibrium.
2
For profits to thrive over a period of time, both aggregate
demand and productive capacities must be rising in a mutually
consistent way.  If demand increases too quickly, shortages of
labor and/or capital will result in upward pressures on costs and
squeeze profit margins.  If demand increases too slowly,
overcapacity will develop, reducing investment and profits.  This
balancing act is a delicate one, but overall growth of demand and
output is expected to favor business profitability.  The main
direction of influence here should be from growth to profit
margins.
3
To decompose corporate profits (R
c) so as to distinguish their
shorter and cyclical movements from long trends, we use the
definitional equation R
c = ðY
c, where ð is the profit margin per12
dollar of corporate income and Y
c is that income.  The profit
margins ð is highly cyclical but approximately stationary, and its
natural logarithm can serve as a measure of profitability.  Theory
suggests and evidence confirms that profitability is likely to be
determined more by the change than by the level of total economic
activity.  By analogy with the much more familiar investment
accelerator, I shall refer to this effect as the "profit
accelerator."
If an economic slowdown reduces profit margins and dims the
outlook for profits, the likely reaction of business firms will
consist first in cutbacks on decisions to invest, then if matters
do not improve, in reductions of inventories, output, and
employment.  Indeed, most recessions are preceded by slowdowns, and
by downturns in profit margins, which are among the earliest
leading indicators.  But not all economic retardations depress
profits and degenerate into business contractions. On occasion,
economic activity may slow seriously but this is outweighed by
productivity and price-cost conditions that remain favorable to
business.
The Determinants of Profits: An Illustration
It is to be expected that the profit margin be positively
associated not only with economic growth but also with technical
progress and the ratio of selling prices to costs of production. 
Further, the profit margin ð should depend inversely on the13
effective market assessment of risk, interest rates, and probably
inflation, particularly when it raises interest and the tax burden
on profits.
Now, consider a regression where the natural logarithm of the
profit margin ð is the dependent variable.  Specifically, ð is
measured here as the ratio of corporate domestic after-tax profits,
with adjustments for inventory valuation and capital consumption,
to corporate domestic income.  (Profit rates on invested capital
might be conceptually preferred, but income is much easier and
better measured than the present economic value of physical, human,
and intellectual capital.)  The independent variables are the rate
of economic growth in real GDP (g); change in labor productivity,
that is, output per hour of work in nonfarm business sector (h);
the chain-weighted price index for GDP as a measure of the price
level (P); unit labor costs in the business sector (C); change in
the consumer price index as a measure of inflation (p); the long-
term interest rate on Treasury bonds (i); and a measure of risk
aversion (s) given by the difference, yield on new high-grade
corporate bonds minus yield on long-term Treasury bonds.
4 All data
except i and s are converted to log form and extend from the fourth
quarter of 1953 to the first quarter of 1998, thus comprising 178
quarterly observations.  Some of the data are lagged one or two
quarters, and a constant term is added. The results of such a
regression, with t-ratio statistics in parentheses, are:14
ðt =2.935+1.486gt+2.657ht+3.248Pt-1-3.343Ct-1-2.278pt-2-0.031it-1-0.094st-1
   (12.52) (1.81) (3.30) (4.24)   (4.31)    (1.85)  (2.87)   (2.83)     
All coefficients are significant by conventional standards, and the
R
2 of the regression (adjusted for the degrees of freedom) is
0.927. All signs are as expected.  Productivity h and growth g are
positively interrelated, and rises in either or both are good for
profits.  The ratio of prices to costs P/C should have a strong
positive influence on profit margins, but when P and C are taken
separately, their coefficients should be about equal with opposite
signs, and they are.  Inflation reduces true profits by increasing
taxes on spurious accounting profits from inventories that keep
appreciating and depreciation of historical instead of replacement
costs of capital.  If one calculates profit margins without
adjustments for inventory valuation and capital consumption, then
the coefficient on inflation becomes statistically insignificant. 
When i is not included, the effect on ð of p is sometimes positive.
 To the extent that transient changes in inflation do not affect
nominal interest rates, they may be associated with a rise in
aggregate demand and a fall in real interest rates.  Higher
interest rates and risk, however, are consistently and strongly
reflected in lower profitability.
These regression results make intuitive sense and are
generally robust.  For example, one can substitute different
measures of economic growth like the composite index of coincident
indicators (either contemporaneous or lagged one time period) for15
real GDP, and find similar results.  Or one can use largely
analogous determinants for changes in the log of total real
profits.  Sources of gross corporate income include sales to each
of the major sectors of the U.S. economy and abroad; hence the
change in the natural log of Y
c is related to the the change in the
natural log terms for consumption, investment, government spending,
exports and imports with the expected signs and roughly according
to their relative magnitudes, but with investment particularly
significant.  However, it must also be noted that the ð regression
still leaves a systematic pattern of change in the error terms.  An
AR(1) autoregressive residual correction, which was used to
eliminate that pattern, raised R
2 from already high to above 0.9
and the Durbin-Watson DW statistic to near 2.
5  I hope to give more
attention to how the equation for ð could be further improved in
form and content in future work.
But the basic theme should not be lost here. A capitalist
economy displays an ongoing drive for profits, which will be
particularly successful under conditions of rising demand,
productivity and confidence, and falling interest rates and risk
aversion.  Profitability declines when costs encroach on prices: 
this is the expansion-restraining factor stressed by Mitchell, and
the dependence of ð on P/C, which is confirmed here, is consistent
with that theory.  But other factors may also weaken profitability,
and endanger continued prosperity, and they relate broadly to
changes in demand, technology, and expectations.  Particularly16
important here are the feedback effects from real investment
decisions that are risky but hard to reverse and from business and
consumer confidence and financial market shifts.  Actions of firms,
investors, and to a lesser extent consumers are subject to risk and
uncertainty, misperceptions and errors, which at times can result
in aggregate imbalances.
Investment as Source of Growth and Instability
Various measures of corporate profits show a strong positive
influence on generally lagging business fixed investment (see,
e.g., Carrier, 1997, ch.6).  There are at least three reasons for
the connection. First, rising profits from past and current
operations are probably the main source of expectations of higher
profits on investments already under way and under active
consideration.  Second, retained profits and cash flow provide the
least expensive and preferred means of financing investment. 
Third, recorded profitability serves as the decisive indicator of
the appropriateness of past investment decisions and has
reputational effects on the access to credit for external
investment financing.
Indeed, profit variables -- rates, margins and totals -- are
empirically much more strongly correlated with investment than
output growth is.  It is possible that growth affects profits first
and more, investment later and less.  A deep reason for this may be
that early successes of innovational investment are a major source17
of both economic growth and profits, whereas subsequent imitational
investment has a more mixed impact on both.  Also, since the
decisions to invest in plant and equipment are long-lived, it would
be suboptimal for such investment to rise and fall in close
correspondence with short-run changes in output or sales, and
wrongheaded for it to respond symmetrically to negative as well as
positive movements in either current or expected economic activity.
However, the association between business capital formation
and profits is not unidirectional, but rather a complex interaction
with differential lags and common factors such as, notably, the
rate of real economic growth.  In the short run, the dominant
relationship runs from profits to investment, in the longer run
mainly in the opposite direction -- that is, more investment
results in more growth, which produces more profits that lead to
more investment and capital accumulation.  The process is fueled on
the financial side by expansions of credit and the monetary base
and on the real side by rising incomes and confidence of consumers,
investors, and business.  It is to some extent self-rewarding and
can endure for considerable time. Successful investment projects
allow profits to be realized and so their stream becomes over time
a continuous, though uneven, process of income creation and saving,
that is, accumulation of capital or wealth.  Thus, it may be a
useful oversimplification to say that without investment there is
no growth and without growth there is no profit.18
In the early stages of a business expansion, the prospects for
its continuing are typically uncertain, which causes relatively
unambitious but safe investment projects to be preferred.  Although
interest rates move procyclically most of the time, they often
continue declining long after real economic activity has embarked
upon the process of recovery.  The longer the lag of the upturn in
interest behind the upturn of the economy, the better the prospects
that prosperity will strengthen and continue (Cagan, 1969).  The
waning of uncertainty about the economic outlook inherited from
previous weakness occurs while the liquidity levels are still high,
the capacity utilization rates moderate, and prices and costs
relatively stable.  In combination, these conditions probably
approach a favorable equilibrium as well as possible.  By then,
profits will have been improving for some time already, with higher
expected returns and rising incentives to invest likely to follow.
 The entrepreneurial search for profit opportunities is at such
times particularly enhanced by improved demand and cost conditions,
as well as by  increasing support from financial institutions and
markets that share the prevailing favorable outlook.
Profit rates tend to have much larger and earlier procyclical
movements than interest rates.  So have credit flows, that is,
changes in business loans or funds raised by private nonfinancial
borrowers.  This is consistent with the theory that, during
business expansions, market interest rates tend to stay below the
"natural rate" -- that is, the expected yield or marginal19
productivity of investment -- which is shifting upward with the
investment demand function.  Interest rates adjust upward but
slowly, which reflects the accomodating increases in credit to
finance investment.
6
A rising stock market helps to keep the expansion going in
several ways.  It lowers the costs of capital, which aids real
investment.  Its wealth effect makes for higher consumption.  It
channels some part of the monetary growth into the demand for
equities, which may result in less inflationary rise in prices of
goods and services and more rise in prices of stocks. But the quest
and competition for higher returns entail increasing risks. The
riskiness of an investment project is likely to be the greater, the
longer its duration and the higher its prospective yield.
7
Therefore, vigorous and protracted expansions reach into higher
risk layers by raising the volume and share of large-scale capital
spending projects. To overcome the higher risk barriers, more
confident expectations of higher yield may have to be entertained
by producers, financiers, and investors.  There is much prior
belief and some evidence that boom periods and bull markets breed
confidence and indeed raise the danger of overconfidence in real
and financial investment decisions.
Not all investment projects enhance growth; some turn out to
be malinvestments mismatching resources and demand, others to be
excessive, creating overcapacity in particular industries or
regions.  When discovered, these errors and the resulting losses20
discourage investment and deter growth.  According to the notion of
overinvestment common to a variety of Swedish and Austrian theories
of long standing, a cumulation of such poor investments can put an
end to a business expansion. Two simple but important insights can
be offered on behalf of this idea: sound new opportunities to
invest are scarce at any time, and forecasting costs and returns on
long-term business investment projects is often extraordinarily
difficult.  Accordingly, the probability of serious errors in
investment decisions is high, even if massive efforts are made to
study the alternatives and find the seemingly best plans or
gambles. 
Still, so long as the economy expands, the rising risks and
failures tend to be more than offset by increases in the much
larger volume of safe and successful undertakings.  Even bad
investment projects, as well as good ones, add to the immediate
stream of spending and keep up overall demand.  Where substantial
gestation periods are required to increase the capital stock,
demand is likely to grow faster than capacity.  It is only when
demand slackens, profits fall, and business retrenchment threatens
that the existence of excess capacities is revealed.  When the boom
is over, the growing risks it entails can no longer remain
underestimated or even undetected; for example, the bad debts
incurred when credit standards were unduly relaxed, as the deals
seemed too good to miss, show up as such when business turns
sluggish.21
It is the cyclically most sensitive processes, such as new
commitments to invest in plant and equipment, and sectors, such as
manufacturing and construction, that are likely to be the earliest
to cease expanding.  This need not imply an immediate downturn,
since there is a backlog of unfilled orders to work off and other
sectors, particularly the largest and most inertial one,
consumption of nondurable goods and services, may hold up and
maintain economic activity.  But such relief tends to be temporary.
 Investment expenditures lag well behind commitments (new capital
appropriations, orders, contracts) but their growth will decline
soon, with adverse feedback effects on profits (Zarnowitz 1973,
1992).
Factors in Recession and Recovery
Eventually, one or more of the following scenarios can be
expected to make the economy highly vulnerable to recession. 
First, a growth slowdown may depress profits and business
investment. Second, profit rates will generally fall and meet the
slowly rising interest rates. Third, some large business and
financial failures can no longer be ignored.  Usually, bad loans
and bad investments have already been piling up; now they must be
written off, and costs of legal and industrial conflicts may be on
the rise, too.  Fourth, credit markets begin to turn away from high
risk and leverage to safe and liquid assets.  This may degenerate
into a credit crunch, that is, curtailment of lending and scramble22
for liquidity.  Fifth, an increasing number of corporate earnings
reports disappoint prior expectations, and stock prices turn down.
 The higher were the price-earnings ratios lifted by a long and
confident bull market, the lower they may fall after a denouement.
It is possible for any of these developments to occur in isolation
and do only transitory harm, but they often appear in combinations,
which is particularly destructive. 
There is no clear causal chain between business recessions and
stock market crashes, banking panics, or credit crunches. Financial
crises more typically follow business downturns, but sometimes
precede them. The worst, severe disruptions in the availability of
credit, with sharp declines in the liquidity and prices of assets,
developed in past periods of deflation.  The relatively mild credit
crunches in the inflationary era of the last half-century occurred
mostly during recessions (Zarnowitz, 1992, ch.3).  A financial
market disorder always poses the danger that overreaction on the
upgrade will be followed by overreaction on the downgrade, a long
observed "herding" phenomenon of crowd psychology, about which
historical and institutional analysis may have much more to say
than deductive theory based on individual rational behavior
(Kindleberger, 1989).
The slowdowns preceding business cycle peaks often fall
heavily on consumption which, though much more stable than
investment, can be highly sensitive to shifts in expectations
concerning employment, price and wage trends, and household assets23
and debts.  This aggravating factor of fallling consumption is best
seen as a part of the cyclical process already described, rather
than as another independent cause of it.  The source of the
developments to which consumers respond lies mainly elsewhere in
the economy, for example, in incomes earned in business and
government and in interest rates.
8
The cumulative process works in reverse during business
contractions.  Here the market rate of interest declines less than
the natural rate based on expected profits, which may temporarily
drop very low; so investment demand falls well below saving supply.
 Historically, cash flowed into the banks, money and prices fell,
credit deflation replaced credit inflation, and borrowing was
strongly discouraged.  In major contractions, such developments
still need to be considered, despite great changes in the
underlying conditions which require modifications of the theory.
9
The cumulative downward movements in profits, credit, and
early investment commitments typically start before business cycle
peaks but they also end before business cycle troughs.  Costs of
production and construction, marketing and finance fall in
recessions, as the demands for many cost factors decrease more than
the corresponding supplies.  To the extent that the selling prices,
which may be less flexible, resist the downward pressures better,
profit margins will improve.  Progress in knowledge industries,
technology, and organization does not stop in recessions, and
eventually the centers of growth overcome the centers of decline.24
There are also certain important asymmetries.  On the upswing,
businesses may have benefited from rises in wages lagging behind
rises in prices, but on the downswing wages may decrease less (or
increase more) than prices, with further profit-squeezing and
layoff-prompting effects.  Also, when a cumulated decline in prices
is anticipated in contractions, current spending is slowed,
especially via postponement of large-ticket purchases, whereas if
output prices are expected to keep rising in expansions, current
spending is accelerated.
As interest rates continue falling and profit margins start
improving, the stock market grows less bearish and bottoms out,
typically in the latter part of the recession.  The early upturn in
equity prices is often hesitant, but gradually a firmer bull market
develops as the recovery gains strength and spreads.  The longer
the good times roll, the greater the confidence that they will
last.  Business firms, banks, and other suppliers of credit and
capital increasingly favor higher-yield, higher-risk investment
projects and instruments.  So in time, the economy returns to the
favorable conditions likely to give rise to another phase of high
growth in credit, investment, and profits.
Cyclical Investment Functions Exemplified
Consider the determination of gross private nonresidential
investment in constant dollars as illustrated by the following
regression:25
It=0.788+0.040Rt-1+0.294Ht-1+0.021SPt-1-0.006it-4+0.007it-0.016st-1+0.0008xt+0.851It-1.
  (-3.81) (2.85)  (4.88)   (2.44)    (-2.66)  (4.19) (-2.68)  (4.63)   (31.71)
Here the capital letters refer to natural logarithms of levels for
investment (I), after tax profits in constant dollars (R), labor
productivity (H), and the Standard and Poor's 500 stock price index
(SP); i and s stand for interest rates and risk, as defined before;
and x represents the exchange rate of the dollar.  The equation
covers the period Q1 1967-Q1 1998 (125 quarterly observations) and
shows all coefficients to be significant with expected signs (t-
ratios in parentheses) and an adjusted R
2 of 0.997. Notice that I
is in part determined by the same variables that influence profits
such as the interest rate, risk aversion, and productivity,
although predominantly with longer lags.  But even after all these
and still other effects are accounted for, real investment in
producers' durable equipment and structures is still found to be
positively influenced by total real profits earned in the United
States during the previous period.
Some technical problems with this particular regression
deserve attention.  Business capital outlays are lagged and
smoothed functions of the more volatile investment commitments, and
as such substantially autocorrelated (Zarnowitz, 1973).  This
explains the high and highly significant coefficient of It-1 in the
above equation, but it also suggests that it would be instructive
to examine the sources of business capital investment after26
properly differencing the relevant variables. The interest rate,
which is represented by the yield on long-term Treasury bonds,
shows the expected negative effect when taken four quarters earlier
but a very similar positive effect when taken in the same quarter.
 This suggests the possibility of a reverse causation: investment,
by raising output closer to capacity, pushes up interest rates. 
But this interaction, although plausible, is somewhat complicated
and clearly requires more study and better estimation.  Here I add
one more regression cast in form of differences instead of levels:
ÄIt=0.025+1.086gt+ 0.052rt-2+0.041spt-3-0.007Äit-6-0.019st-1+0.021frt-1+0.001Äxt-1-0.002bft.
   (4.06) (6.08)  (2.04)   (1.57)    (-2.18)   (-4.16)   (2.44)   (2.84)    (-0.52)
The change in the log of business fixed investment (ÄIt)
depends positively on changes in the logarithms of the following:
real GDP (gt), real profits (rt-2), the stock price index (spt-3),
funds raised by private nonfinancial borrowers (frt-1) and the
exchange value of the dollar (Äxt-1). The change in It depends
inversely on the increase in the long-term interest rate over the
previous six quarters (Äit-6), on risk (st-1) and the change in log
of the liabilities of business failures (bft). This equation covers
the period Q3 1967-Q11998 (123 observations); its adjusted R
2 is
0.512, the Durbin-Watson statistic is 2.108.  Again, all regression
coefficients have the expected signs and all except the last one
have significant t-statistics.  Although the lead times were not
systematically selected, they appear to be in approximate agreement27
with the relative timing of cyclical movements in the variables
concerned. 
Thus, stock prices tend to have intermediate leads at the
economy's turning points, real business fixed investment tends to
have short lags.  Profits, which the stock market is always trying
to anticipate, should have sizable but shorter leads vs.
investment.  Differencing may have magnified the variability of
timing along with the volatility of the data and raised the weight
of contemporaneous values, particularly for gt, an apparently
strong and close determinant of the change in It.But the effects on
spending of monetary and interest rate changes have repeatedly been
shown to be very slow, and our regressions are consistent with this
finding.
Further, it is of interest that even the mild risk proxy,
which compares the yields of high-grade corporate and Treasury
bond yields, has a definite adverse effect on investment in the
next quarter.  The influence of credit is reflected with the same
timing in the positive coefficient of the relative change in
funds raised by private nonfinancial borrowers.  The harmful role
of overinvestment and malinvestment shows up in the negative
coefficient of the relative change in current liabilities of
business failures; however, this is probably a weak
representation of this factor and an underestimate.  It will
require more work to capture the elusive channels of influence
whereby rising risk and losses deter further capital28
accumulation.  Finally, an increase in the dollar's exchange
value has a small but significant influence on the change in I,
presumably because it stimulates direct foreign investment in the
United States.
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Core and Peripheral Elements in Business Cycles
The classical literature on business cycles preferred
endogenous theories, stressing the interrelated functions for
business investment and profits, credit, interest rates, relative
input and output prices, and the role of the associated risks,
uncertainties, and expectations.  The great expository work of
Haberler first published in 1937 demonstrates this point clearly.
Since then, however, most economists shifted to the view that
exogenous disturbances, stochastic elements, and policy factors,
in short 'shocks' of various kinds, are the true 'causes' of
business cycles.  It is recognized that the shocks must be
propagated in particular ways by the dynamics of an economy of
interdependent markets, but this is believed to be tractable with
a wide range of models and compatible with the postulates of the
modern general equilibrium theory.  The old idea of self-
sustaining cycles is generally given no attention at all, but
just summarily dismissed (Zarnowitz 1992, chs. 1 and 2).
I view the current emphasis on shocks as way overdone. 
Intensive arguments about whether business cycles are due to real29
or monetary shocks, or domestic or foreign shocks, are conducted
as if these were well identified categories that include all that
matters and preclude each other; also, as if the underlying
models could be taken to represent the economy so well as to rule
out the possibility of cycles being endogenous.  But these
premises are simply not credible.  Shocks come in a great variety
of combinations and frequently are not well identified (Blatt,
1978; Eckstein and Sinai, 1986; Black, 1986).  There is little
agreement on which theoretical and econometric models of the
economy are the right ones to use, hence it is difficult to know
what should be taken to constitute a deviation from an
established model relationship.  I feel quite skeptical of our
ability to sort out the shocks as demanded by the desire to
discriminate between current alternative models.
Moreover, there are good reasons to accept lead-lag
relationships and nonlinearities as important features of the
dynamics that can account for the endogenous content of business
cycles.  But this major aspect of the economy's motion is simply
missed by those analysts who concentrate on the role of shocks in
linear models constructed with little or no attention to timing
differences, interactions between potentially self-generating
movements of strongly fluctuating variables, and likely cyclical
asymmetries.  I see these elements as being at the core of
business cycles, while the outside disturbances whose causal role
is often questionable are more peripheral, transitory and30
episodic.
The broad movements of the economy, including its turning
points, are best seen as sequential processes unfolding in
historical time, not as isolated events.  Those historical and
statistical studies of recorded experience that I find especially
revealing assign a deeper causal role to imbalances developing
during the phases of the fluctuations than to exogenous shocks. 
Cyclical boom-and-bust imbalances never originate exclusively in
either demand or supply, but instead always refer to the
interplay between the two market sides.  This is so whether the
problem is a shortfall of business or consumer demand; monetary
or real overinvestment; vertical maladjustment (plans to invest
outrun decisions to save) or horizontal maladjustment
(overcapacity in some particular sector or region); financial
instability or crisis of confidence.  Attempting to categorize
shocks as stemming from aggregate demand or aggregate supply
alone seldom reveals anything deep or interesting about the
determinants of economic expansions and contractions.
The system of leading, coincident, and confirming indicators
consists of time series data that have, in many studies, proved
essential as tools for identifying, dating, analyzing, and
forecasting business cycles.  It is well to know that this
approach originated in the basic working concept of Mitchell and
his associates at the National Bureau of Economic Research, which
was that the recurrent fluctuations of a private enterprise31
economy are caused by changes in the outlook for profits.  When
the outlook is favorable, investment and production expand, when
it is adverse, they contract.  A number of the principal leading
indicators refer to directly profit-related business
expectations, commitments, and activities in financial, labor,
and product markets.
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However, while the case for business cycles having a
dominant endogenous core is very strong, it should not be
overstated.  Real, monetary, expectational, domestic and foreign
factors all participate in economic fluctuations, and unexpected
changes and combinations occur in all of these categories.
Unquestionably, some identifiable large shocks have been
important.  Major wars have had lasting economic consequences, as
when World War II finally ended the Great Depression, and small
wars influenced at least the timing of some business cycle
turning points, as in the Iraq intervention in 1990.  The OPEC
cartel decisions in the 1970s can surely be viewed as exogenous
events.
Monetary and fiscal policy actions can cause unexpected
increases or decreases in interest and tax rates.  But even where
it seems clearcut to many that the Fed has created a recession,
matters are much more complex. For example, the monetary policy
shift in October 1979 allowed interest rates to reach
unprecedented double-digit levels, which no doubt had much to do
with the timing and unusual sequence of the two back-to-back U.S.32
recessions in 1980 and 1981-82.  But the downturn of 1980 was
also preceded by the second oil shock, to which it has been
attributed by some analysts (Temin, 1998).  The business cycle of
1980-92 witnessed other novel developments, too, notably very
large drops in the velocity of money. 
In 1987, 1990, and 1994-95, the Fed failed to anticipate but
reacted successfully to troubles in the stock market, the
economy, and the bond market, respectively.  Much of the time,
monetary policies are accommodating, reactive or passive.  Even
when the Fed seeks to assert active control, its policies operate
with long and variable lags.  Contrary to what might be called
the central bankers' theory of business cycles, economic
expansions do not necessarily generate excessive inflation to be
countered by tight monetary policies.  Also, contrary to some of
their critics, the moves of central bankers to raise interest
rates to prevent or cool a boom do not necessarily either cause
or explain recessions.
The record of U.S. fiscal policies on the business cycle is
found to be even more mixed, but largely negative. The sharp
post-Korean War cutbacks in defense spending aggravated the 1953-
54 recession; also, the tardiness and errors of fiscal policy
contributed to the setbacks of the 1970s (Blinder, 1979).
Surprises and disappointments are especially frequent and
important in the markets for financial assets. But what matters
in the present context is not the randomly dispersed individual33
price shocks that occur in these markets on each business day. 
Rather, it is the waves of optimism and pessimism, which spread
through large numbers of investors and traders from time to time
and are often seen later as excessive reactions. Journalists
often refer to these errors as manifestations of "greed" and
"fear", as do many traders themselves.  This opinion (or self-
criticism) is overly rhetorical but not groundless; it does not
deserve a derisive reaction from economists who in turn overstate
the rationality of economic decision-making under uncertainty. As
already noted, such shared errors of judgement in private real
and financial investment decisions can be endogenously market-
moved and market-moving, and hence important indeed.
A View of Some Recent Developments
The current U.S. business cycle expansion will be eight
years old in March 1999 and is already the longest in peacetime,
second only to the one during the Vietnam period in the 1960s. 
However, both the 1960s and the 1980s saw much larger overall
rises in real GDP and total employment as well as larger declines
in the rate of unemployment, as shown in lines 1-2 of Table 1. In
the first five years of this expansion, from March 1991 to March
1996, U.S. output grew only about 13 percent, compared to average
growth of 28 percent in the same stage of the long upswings in
the 1960s and 1980s.  The unemployment rate actually continued to34
rise for 15 months into the 1991-92 recovery, which is highly
unusual.
Although the recession of 1990-91 was relatively mild and
short, the whole period of late 1980s and early 1990s was
sluggish.  Net private domestic investment declined sharply,
layoffs spread, wages of other than high-skilled workers lagged
badly, household debts increased, and consumer confidence fell. 
Slowdowns before recessions are common but sluggish recoveries
like the one in the early 1990s are quite rare: typically, the
first several years of expansion see the highest economic growth.
A brief, mild slowdown in 1995 followed a year of rising
commodity prices, a bond market downturn, and interest rate
increases driven in part by the Fed's preventive
counterinflationary actions.  It was not until 1996-98 that U.S.
output growth accelerated to surpass the historical pattern. 
Real investment in structures, which had been declining in the
early 1990s, has risen smartly in recent years.  Investment in
producers' durable equipment, which includes computers, was
extremely strong, its growth far exceeding the past record (Table
1, lines 3-4 and 5-6).  Corporate profit margins increased
strongly during the upswing in the 1990s, rising from 6 percent
to the range of 8-10 percent. This high and growing
profitability, exceeding the records in previous long expansions,
helps explain the recent boom in business capital investment. The
extraordinary bull market in stocks has served as a powerful35
stimulator of both business and household investment (lines 7-8).
Housing starts, too, increased much faster, longer, and more
steadily in this expansion than in those of the 1960s and 1980s.
The U.S. inflation rate has actually declined during this
expansion, from 4.2 percent in March 1991 to 1.1 percent in March
1998, which is unique for the last half-century (lines 3-4).
Falling prices of computers and related products, oil, other
commodities, and many imports from countries in conditions of
financial and economic distress help explain the U.S.
disinflation. 
Nominal interest rates declined strongly in 1991-94,
reflecting the weakness of the recovery.  Later, while the short
rates increased mildly and stabilized, the long rates moved
lower.  Presumably, the persistent weakness of prices reduced
expected inflation.  In the past, interest rates increased in the
corresponding cycle stages along with higher inflation (lines 5-
6). For real interest rates, which tend to be negatively
correlated with inflation, the converse apparently applied: they
increased in the current expansion, particularly for the short
rates, whereas they decreased in the previous expansions during
which inflation rose. Consistent with the regression estimates in
this paper, the declines in inflation and long interest rates,
along with the rises in profits and stock prices, had the
combined effect of fueling the investment boom.  I would argue
that it was mainly this process that has allowed the U.S.36
business expansion to last so long. 
However, some technology, pricing, and policy factors
helped, too.  Thus, the six-month smoothed growth rate of the
broad money supply was low and at times negative in 1991-94,
before rising higher more recently.  This shift to a more
permissive or stimulative stance is the opposite to that adopted
in the earlier expansions, when the monetary growth rates tended
to be higher in early than in late stages. Fears that this
acceleration will reignite inflation have been falsified by
events so far, and hence muted.  But there is a new concern, that
the Fed has allowed an overexpansion of credit to feed a bull
market in stocks that may be overvalued and headed toward a
crash.  Growth of federal debt declined steeply and consistently
in 1991-98.  This happy success helped to moderate interest
rates, among other positive consequences. 
Recent estimates show real GDP growth at 3.9 percent in
1998, marking a third consecutive strong year of growth. However,
to infer that the expansion will persist just because it has
persisted so far, is a non sequitur.  The dynamic factors
stressed in this paper are continously at work and they will
shape the economy's course. For example, the question of whether
and when the very high expected profits apparently expected by
the booming stock market will be confirmed by actual profits
retains great importance. 
The theory relating business cycles to the volatility of37
profits, investment, credit, and financial markets remains
relevant not only in the United States and Europe, where the
theory has its historical roots, but even in Asia's new and
different settings during the 1990s. Japan's economy was for a
long time the envy of the world and the model for the smaller
Asian economies, thanks to its pattern of long and vigorous
expansions interrupted only by mild slowdowns. But then
speculative excesses in Japan's real estate and stocks led to
bubbles that eventually burst.  The result in the 1990s has been
a long stagnation, intermittent price and debt deflation, and two
business cycle contractions (one in late 1992 and 1993, the
second underway since about March 1997). Elsewhere along Asia's
Pacific rim, expectations of high growth and high returns had
attracted large foreign capital inflows. In mid-1997, however,
debt and currency crises undermined investor confidence, causing
panics and massive flight of capital.  Yet Thailand's economy
began to weaken in mid-1995 and entered a recession a year later.
Korea's slowdown started in early 1996, its contraction in August
1997.  The boom-and-bust sequences in East Asia can be traced
back to overinvestment and malinvestment as more and more credit,
much of it short-term, was directed to speculative ventures, weak
financial intermediaries, and industries with excess capacity. 
As a result, exports slowed, risk rose, and profits fell rapidly.
The east Asian crises of 1997 and 1998 were in fact triggered by
just the sort of fundamental imbalances in investment, profits,38
and credit -- for a rich discussion, see Corsetti, Pesenti and
Roubini (1998) -- that are central to an endogenous view of
business cycles.
Concluding Remarks
Changes of great importance have been and still are
occurring in the economies around the world, including
globalization of production, trade, and finance; structural
shifts from country to city, farming to industry, goods to
services; and vast innovations in technology, business
management, and conduct of economic policies.  After a
deterioration in the 1970s and early 1980s, U.S. business cycles
have become more moderate, as in the earlier part of the post-
World War II era.  However, a study of seven large and seven
smaller economies shows that recessions were more frequent in the
second half than in the first half of the post-World War II
period (Zarnowitz, 1998b).
Long business expansions benefit society by raising
employment, consumption, productivity, and profitability, but
they generate imbalances and are difficult to sustain.  The
interaction of profits, investment, credit and financial markets
is an enduring feature of market economies, which plays a central
role in business cycles.  The U.S. upswing of the past three
years provides a vivid example of how profits and investment can
reinforce each other, especially when combined with an exuberant39
stock market. Recent events in Asia demonstrate how investment-
dominated booms can give way to a protracted stagnation with
tendencies toward deflation and underconsumption (Japan) or to
severe recessions harking back to the worst depressions of the
past (what used to be called the "newly industrialized economies"
or the "tigers" of east Asia). Of course, there are many deep
differences between the U.S. and the countries in recent crises:
no forecasts or precise parallels are intended here.  What I do
suggest is that the same endogenous domestic variables assume
major roles in business cycles observed in different economies,
and that the relations between them are likely to follow broadly
similar patterns.40
Acknowledgements
I thank Hans Nilsson for ongoing discussions and expert help
with the regressions; Robin Privman for efficient research
assistance; and Vicky Winslow and Masha Veksler for help with
typing the drafts of this paper.  The paper benefited greatly
from careful reading by Brad De Long and Timothy Taylor.41
Table 1
Comparing the U.S. Business Expansion of the 1990s with Those
of the 1960s and 1980s, by Selected Variables and Stages
                 Percent Change in Years of Expansion          Value of Series at Month
                        1-3           4-5           6-7           1-7            1             36            60            84
                        (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)           (5)           (6)           (7)            (8)
                               Real Gross Domestic Product          Unemployment Rate
Current Cycle     7.9           4.6           8.0           22.0          6.8           6.5           5.5           4.7
Past Average    17.3           9.1           6.1           35.8          8.9           6.2           4.8           4.6
                                      Nonresidential Structures          CPI Inflation Rate
Current Cycle -13.5           9.8          11.2            5.7           4.2           2.5           3.0           1.1
Past Average   13.8           2.3           -0.6          15.6           2.6           2.5           3.6           4.1
                              Producers Durable Equipment          Corporate Bond Yield
Current Cycle  26.9          22.7          30.8        103.6          9.1           7.6           7.6           6.6
Past Average   37.8            8.6            9.7          64.2          8.2           7.8           7.6           7.9
                                  S&P 500 Stock Price Index          Corporate Profit Margin
Current Cycle  22.0          39.5          66.4        183.2          6.0           8.0          10.0          9.0
Past Average   26.4          22.9          27.6          98.1          7.4           8.4            9.3          8.1
Dating: According to the NBER chronology, the current U.S. business cycle expansion   
             began in March 1991 (for monthly data) or first quarter of 1991 (for quarterly
             data).  Hence, for the “Current Cycle”, the years denote: 1-3, 3/1991-3/1994; 4-5,
             3/1994-3/1996; etc.  The months denote: 1, 3/1991; 36, 3/1994; 60, 3/1996; 84,
             3/1998.  “Past Average” refers to U.S. expansions of February 1961-December
             1969 and of November 1982-July 1990.  Here the years and months are dated
             analogously starting in February 1961 and November 1982.
Sources: The Conference Board, Business Cycle Indicators:42
               Real GDP, series 55, nonresid. structures, 87; prod. dur. eqpt., 88; stock price
               index, 19; unemployment rate, series 43; CPI inflation rate, 320; corp. bond
               yield, 116; corp. profit margin, 81.4344
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more general connection that growth increases profits as a whole.
4. The data used are based on the following series in the Business
Cycle Indicators published by the Conference Board:  profits are
series 81; economic growth, 55; productivity growth, 358; the price
level, 311; employment cost level, 63; inflation rate, 320;
interest rate on long-term Treasury bonds, 115; and interest rate
on new high-grade corporate securities, 116.
5. The correction (AR(1)=0.844) helped explain the large local
trends (up in 1953-65, down in 1966-74, and up again since 1980),
which show up in ð in addition to pronounced cycles and in absenceof any overall trend
6. It is worth noting that these observations are broadly
consistent with certain ideas of economists as original and
influential as Wicksell, Schumpeter, Hayek, and Keynes (1930). 
Their theories, though deeply different otherwise, agreed that in
expansions the demand for investment rises above the supply of
saving and is financed by an effectively endogenous process of
creation of credit money.  The classical exposition of the two-rate
model is Wicksell (1901-06).  Here rising demand for money driven
by the firms' perceived profit opportunities is met by rising
supply of bank credit at costs low enough to permit the profits to
be realized.  This is described as an endogenous "cumulative
process," which gradually reduces the excess of investment demand
over saving supply (and of the natural over the market rate).
7. See Cowen (1997) for further, mainly theoretical discussion of
the role of risk in business cycles inspired by old Austrian ideas
as well as modern financial literature. However, his discussion is
generally silent on the other early line of ideas about risk
increasing in investment upswing, from Kalecki (1937) to Shackle
(1970); on which, see Courvisanos (1996).
8. Nevertheless, shocks such as a sudden market crash, outbreak of
a war and fears of shortages, rationing, or credit restrictions
could and on infrequent occasions probably did produce "autonomous"
destabilizing shifts in consumer demand.  For further discussion,
see Temin (1976, 1998), Hall (1986), and Blanchard (1993).
9. The original theory stems from the time when the gold standard
ruled and inflation alternated with deflation so that price level
stability in the long run was widely expected (and reflected in
remarkably stable and low government bond yields).  In the
Wicksellian two-rate model, prices were taken to be perfectly
flexible and changing so as to maintain full employment.  However,
changes in real incomes can be readily added to the cumulative
process, with quantity adjustments either replacing price
adjustments (Laidler, 1972) or, more generally, complementing them.
 It is worth noting that in historical periods of declining or
stable prices nominal aggregates reflected business cycles well and
were widely used, whereas when inflation prevailed, as in the last
half-century, business cycles were best measured in real terms.
10. The data used in the investment regressions of this section
include the following series from Business Cycle Indicators (in
addition to some listed in note 4 above): real business fixed
investment, series 86; real corporate profits, 18; stock price51
index, 19; exchange value of U.S. dollar, 750; funds raised in
credit markets, 110; and current liabilities of business failures,
14.
11. More generally, I believe that the analysis of economic
fluctuations derived substantial benefits from methods developed by
the NBER, including the historical reference dates, turning-point
identification, emphasis on short unit periods, and efforts at
time-series decomposition, deseasonalization, and detrending.  Many
recent studies of business cycles suffer from ignoring the above
matters and relying instead on general methods only.  Some use
annual data which reveal little of what happens during short
recessions, for example.  What is desirable are combinations of
best modern statistical and econometric techniques with insights
from cyclical indicator analysis.  For examples of how leading and
other indicators can be used along with univariate and multivariate
time-series models, Bayesian forecasting methods, probability,
econometric, and nonlinear models, the interested reader might
begin with the essays in P.A. Klein (1990), Lahiri and Moore
(1991), and Stock and Watson (1993) and follow with Zellner, Hong
and Min (1991) and Montgomery, Zarnowitz, Tsay and Tiao (1998).